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Abstract. In this paper, we report on the performance of the SwissQuantum
quantum key distribution (QKD) network. The network was installed in the
Geneva metropolitan area and run for more than one and a half years, from the
end of March 2009 to the beginning of January 2011. The main goal of this
experiment was to test the reliability of the quantum layer over a long period of
time in a production environment. A key management layer has been developed
to manage the key between the three nodes of the network. This QKD-secure
network was used by end-users through an application layer.
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1. Introduction
Quantum random number generators [1, 2] have already been identified as the first
technology resulting from quantum information science to reach the market and
quantum key distribution (QKD) is closely following in its footsteps in this rapidly
emerging field. Indeed, we have gone a long way since the first paper on QKD by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [3] §. The reviews of Gisin et al. [5] and Scarani
et al. [6] present the evolution of QKD over these last few decades. However, to
definitively be a commercial success, QKD needs to demonstrate its integration in
telecommunication networks, its reliability and its robustness.
For integration, QKD has to be adapted to the topologies developed in
telecommunications networks for unicast, multicast and broadcast traffic. Unicast
means point-to-point traffic. Multicast indicates traffic between a subgroup of
nodes of the network. Broadcast denotes traffic shared between all the nodes of the
network. As current QKD links are basically point-to-point links, the integration
in telecommunications networks requires additional optical components and/or
software. According to the requirements of the network and the present state of the
art of quantum devices, two types of QKD networks can be implemented presently:
either based on trusted intermediate nodes or additional optical components.
Trusted-node networks allow one to expand the maximal distance of QKD, but
require physically secure intermediate nodes. QKD networks based on optical
components (active optical switches, circulators or passive dense wavelength
division multiplexing, for instance) allow one to share infrastructure (fibre link,
for instance) and do not need trusted intermediate nodes. However, with this
type of QKD networks, the maximal distance and the bit rate are limited by the
optical attenuation of the link. Note that the two types of nodes can be mixed.
Thus, in the last few years, several QKD networks have been deployed and tested
using trusted nodes and/or optical components [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
These networks, with the exception of the network presented in [8], were deployed
for short periods of time: at most a few months. The quantum layer of the
SwissQuantum network relies on trusted intermediate nodes and ran for almost
two years. Note that another kind of work has been done on the integration of QKD
in optical fibre networks over the last years. This work focuses on the multiplexing
of quantum channels with classical channels on a single fibre [16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
The main motivation for this is the reduction of the cost of QKD implementation
§ A paper of Wiesner on quantum money, written in the 70’s but published only in 1983 [4],
inspired Bennett and Brassard for their paper.
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by sharing a fibre for multiple applications and/or users, e.g. point to point QKD
and classical communication with wavelength demultiplexing and encryption of
Fibre To The Home (FTTH) communications over Gigabit Ethernet passive optical
networks thanks to keys shared by QKD.
The most important prerequisite for the integration of QKD in a
telecommunications network is reliability because networks run 24 hours a day,
7 days a week, and 365 days a year. Thus, new devices in networks - QKD for
instance - must not degrade the quality of service. Untrusted telecommunications
are preferred to no communication at all by the network community. So, to
demonstrate the integration of QKD technology within communication networks,
we need to show the reliability of this technology over long periods of time and in
production environments.
As next prerequisite, QKD systems require robustness because they run no
longer in a laboratory, but in a rough environment. People working in server
rooms do not always handle QKD systems with the same care as physicists. For
instance, the fibres are not handled as they should in the field environment, e.g.
fibre ends are not always as clean as in laboratory conditions and this can impact on
the losses strongly (for example, dirty connectors can introduce -3dB extra losses
corresponding to more than 10 km of fibre). As written before, if the losses are
too large, the secret key rate of QKD is strongly reduced and can even be reduced
to zero. Classical communications don’t suffer from such an effect because if the
losses are too large, the signal can be regenerated thanks to Er-doped amplifiers
for example. Thus, before installing a QKD system, the fibres have to be chosen
very carefully to have low losses. Note that upon disassembling the network, it
was found that the protective cover of one optical fibre was damaged. In spite of
this, the system still ran correctly.
2. The SwissQuantum testbed
2.1. Topology
The topology of the SwissQuantum network is presented in figure 1. It consists of
three nodes:
• Unige (University of Geneva),
• CERN (Centre Europe´en de Recherche Nucle´aire),
• hepia (Haute E´cole du Paysage, d’Inge´nierie et d’Architecture),
and three point-to-point links:
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• Unige - CERN,
• CERN - hepia,
• hepia - Unige.
Each node is divided in two sub-nodes, one for each point-to-point link
connected to the node. The node at CERN is in France. The two other nodes are
in Switzerland. Hence, the SwissQuantum network is the first international QKD
network.
Figure 1. Map of the SwissQuantum network. Two nodes are in the Geneva
city centre and the third one is on the site of CERN in France (the border is
in red). The white lines are drawn for illustration: they do not represent the
fibres.
2.2. Structure
The SECOQC network [10] introduces the idea of layers for QKD networks. The
concept of layers allows one to add a mediation layer between the QKD layer
and the secure application layer. This provides flexibility in the integration of
QKD devices in telecommunications networks. For instance, in the SECOQC
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network, QKD servers implementing different protocols were associated thanks to
the key management layer. The same type of configuration with three layers was
implemented in the Tokyo QKD network [15].
The SwissQuantum network also consists of three layers (see figure 2):
• a quantum layer composed of QKD point-to-point links implemented with
commercial QKD devices (ID Quantique, id5100) [21];
• a key management layer in charge of the management of secret keys across
the network and between the layers;
• an application layer where the keys provided by the key management layer
are used by the end-user applications.
Figure 2. Structure of one point-to-point link with the quantum, key
management and application layers. The quantum layer generates the secret
keys, and pushes them to the management layer. The key management layer
processes and stores the keys obtained from the quantum layer and pushes them
to any applications which request secret keys (see text for details).
The different layers are presented in more detail in sections 2.4 to 2.6.
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2.3. Detailed layout of the SwissQuantum network
Figure 3 shows the SwissQuantum network topology in more detail. There is one
pair of dark fibres for each node connection, except for the connection between
CERN and Unige. Between CERN and Unige, a pair of fibres is dedicated to the
QKD link and one pair is dedicated to the data transmitted by the commercial
10 Gbps Ethernet encryptors (one fibre for each direction). The data transmitted
by the 10 Gbps encryptors is real data, so it is separated from the QKD network
to avoid data transmission interruption due to maintenance of the QKD network.
Apart from the pair of fibres used by the 10 Gbps encryptors, one fibre of each
pair of dark fibres is used as a quantum channel, whereas the other fibre is used for
transmitting all the classical channels. Depending on the connection, the classical
channels can be composed of the classical channel for the QKD system, the classical
channel for the key servers, the classical channel for encryption applications,
and/or the classical channel for the monitoring of all the devices. Each classical
channel needs to work in both communication directions. In order to multiplex
all the classical channels between two nodes in a single fibre, they are multiplexed
using wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) techniques.
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Figure 3. Detailed topology of the SwissQuantum network. All the lines are
optical fibres for connecting the different apparatus.
One part of the network is missing in figure 3, namely the monitoring network.
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Virtual local area networks (VLAN) were developed to monitor the SwissQuantum
network. The three VLANs, one per layer, were connected to a server at hepia,
which was in charge of the monitoring of the SwissQuantum network. Two firewalls
were deployed: one to avoid illegitimate connections from the internet to the server;
a second one to limit access to the management network. So, only legitimate
entities (ID Quantique, Unige and hepia) could access to the monitoring network
through ssh connections.
2.4. Quantum layer
The quantum layer consists of three point-to-point quantum links described in
Table 1.
Table 1. Characteristics of the QKD links in the SwissQuantum network.
Name Nodes at the two ends Length of
fibre (km)
Optical
loss (dB)
SQ1 CERN - Unige 14.4 -4.6
SQ2 CERN - hepia 17.1 -5.3
SQ3 Unige - hepia 3.7 -2.5
Each quantum link is implemented with a pair of customized commercial
QKD servers (ID Quantique, id5100 [21]). The optical platform of the QKD
servers are based on the so-called plug & play configuration [22]. A simplified
scheme of this go & return configuration is depicted in figure 4. The device on
the left side of figure 4 consists of a Faraday mirror, a phase modulator and
a variable optical attenuator. The other device is composed of an unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, two single-photon detectors and a laser preceded
by an optical circulator. Note that the beamsplitter on the left side of the
interferometer is a polarization beamsplitter. The main advantage of this optical
platform is its intrinsic auto-compensation of phase and polarization fluctuations
in the quantum channel. Indeed, the phase auto-compensation is guaranteed by
the single interferometer which is used for the qubit preparation and analysis.
The polarization auto-compensation is guaranteed by the combination of Alice’s
Faraday mirror with Bob’s polarization beam splitter (more details can be found
in [22]). In figure 2, this corresponds to the optics boxes, which generate the raw
keys and push them to the sifting process. The raw key exchange process stops
when the buffer registering the phases applied on Alice side is full or when the
probability of detection on one or both of Bob’s detectors is too low. For the
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links in the SwissQuantum network, this corresponds typically to 5 to 7 millions
of detections for a full buffer. The sifted keys then follow the reconciliation process
which generates secret keys.
Figure 4. Simplified scheme of the plug & play QKD system. On the left
(Alice): FM, Faraday mirror; ΦA, Alice’s phase modulator; VOA, variable
optical attenuator. On the right (Bob): the unbalanced Mach-zehnder
interferometer with Bob’s phase modulator ΦB ; the laser the circulator and
the two single-photon detectors.
The QKD servers can run with either standard BB84 [3] or SARG [23]
protocols. The standard BB84 and SARG protocols differ only in the sifting
part meaning that both protocols can be run on the same optical platform.
This small difference allows SARG to be more robust against photon number
splitting attacks. Hence, SARG is more efficient than standard BB84 over long
distances. Within the SwissQuantum network, only the SARG protocol was used.
The distillation of the secret keys is performed in three steps: error correction,
privacy amplification and authentication of the classical communications. This
distillation is performed each time Alice’s buffer is full (5 to 7 millions detections,
so 1.25 to 1.75 millions bits after sifting). The error correction is implemented
using the Cascade algorithm [24]. The raw key buffer is split into blocks of 8192
bits that are corrected one after the other. In our implementation, there is no
step of error estimation because we have the exact value of the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) after the error correction. Cascade is robust enough to run
efficiently even when it has only a rough estimate of the QBER value. The privacy
amplification is done with the universal2 hash functions proposed by Krawczyk
and based on Toeplitz matrices [25]. It is performed on the all-sifted buffer. The
authentication is performed according to the Wegman-Carter scheme [26, 27]. All
classical communications of a round of secret key exchange are authenticated at
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the same time. The raw key exchange and the distillation are done sequentially
with typically 4-5 minutes for raw key exchange and 1 minute for the distillation.
The quantum layer continuously generates secret keys and transfers them to the
key management layer.
The initialization of the quantum layer is very important if we want to
guarantee the security of the key exchange using QKD. Indeed, in order to avoid
man-in-the-middle attacks, as written before, the classical communications need to
be authenticated. In our implementation, this authentication requires secret keys
to be performed. Those keys can be provided by the QKD if the quantum exchange
has worked at least once. So, an initial secret needs to be shared by the two devices
for the authentication of the first round of quantum key exchanges. Furthermore,
in the case of an implementation with coherent weak pulses, the probability of
detections must be monitored tightly to avoid photon number splitting attacks.
Hence, the loss value of the quantum channel has to be known in order to first
adjust the mean number of photon per pulse to its optimal value and then compute
the expected probability of detection which is used as a reference for the measured
detection probability monitoring. Both the initial secret key and quantum channel
loss value, are stored in the QKD devices. These two parameters can be entered
through the touch panel of the QKD servers (ID Quantique, id5100) (the blue
screen in the middle of the front panel of the QKD servers in figure 3). This
touch panel is protected by a standard authentication procedure using a password
of at least 8 characters. Before the installation of the devices, they are set in a
factory configuration which does not contain any loss value or initial secret. Those
two parameters are asked during the installation procedure of the devices. Once
the devices have been initialized, the quantum key exchange starts automatically
and it is impossible to change the two parameter values without stopping the key
exchange. To change these parameters, the system needs to be reset to the factory
configuration.
Note that in this paper we do not consider quantum hacking. QKD has
been proven information-theoretically secure. But, of course as any cryptographic
technology, its security relies on security proofs and a correct implementation of
the system. Quantum hacking exists for at least 10 years [28, 29] and has been
particularly active for the last couple of years. Its importance is recognized by
the research community since the middle of 2010 [30, 31]. The goal of quantum
hacking is to show loopholes in given QKD implementations, and to propose
countermeasures against those loopholes [32, 33, 34, 35]. The SwissQuantum
project started before 2010, i.e. before that quantum hacking became an important
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aspect of QKD security. This is why did not include any patch against any of the
attacks demonstrated since the launch of the project to avoid any interruption due
to patching.
2.5. Key management layer
The key management layer is the interface between the quantum layer, where
secret keys are generated, and the application layer, where secret keys are
used. It is responsible for the processing of keys, their storage in each node,
and their management between the nodes and the layers. It consists of one
computer per node, called key server, with a buffer dedicated to key storage and
a synchronization channel between each of them. This approach allows one to go
from a very basic network topology composed of several point-to-point QKD links
to more complex network topologies.
The SwissQuantum project focuses on network features linked to performance,
flexibility and reliability. The main guideline we have followed is based on the
quite recent concept of link aggregation. This concept is used to increase both
the bandwidth and the availability of a link between two locations thanks to
multiple network connections between these locations. Several standards on this
method have been defined since 2000 [36], the latest one, appeared in 2008, is IEEE
802.1AX-2008 [37]. To explain operation of the link aggregation, let us consider a
very simple configuration where two locations are connected through two optical
cables. A switch in each location can direct the data traffic either in the first or in
the second cable. Obviously, link aggregation allows one to increase the bandwidth
by sending half of the traffic through the first fibre and the other half through the
second fibre. If the receiving switch is able to recombine all the data together, the
bandwidth of the link composed of two optical cables is two times higher than that
of a single cable link. Furthermore, if one of the two cables is cut or unplugged,
all the data can be redirected to the remaining active cable, providing greater
network resilience. For this reason, we believe that quantum networks should have
this kind of features. Thus, we have applied the link aggregation concept to the
distribution of quantum keys. The main difference between QKD networks and
classical networks is that in classical networks data is transmitted whereas in QKD
networks secret keys are exchanged. It is extremely problematic to lose data, but
a reduction of the key exchange rate has no impact on either data or security.
This is why for QKD link aggregation we do not need active switches. The same
buffers can be used on both sides to store the keys exchanged through the first
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and the second link. The applications do not need to know if the keys they are
using have been exchanged through link one or two, but they need to get the same
keys on both sides. If one of the two links is down, there are still keys exchanged
through the other link. The rate of secret keys stored in the buffers is the sum
of the rate of the keys exchanged through the first link and the rate of the ones
exchanged through the second link. Our implementation of QKD link aggregation
doesn’t require active switches, but as many QKD systems as the number of links
between the two locations. Indeed, our QKD link aggregation implementation
needs two sets of QKD devices, one for each link. More technical information on
the implementation can be found in section 3.
In addition to the link aggregation configuration, parallel key agreement
was implemented. The parallel key agreement consists of the combination of
secret keys obtained by independent processes. In the key management layer
of the SwissQuantum network, the simplest version of parallel key agreement
was implemented: dual-key agreement. The keys exchanged with quantum
cryptography and keys exchanged with help of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI,
[38]) are combined to obtain the final key. Depending on the combination
technique, this final key can be as secure as the more secure of the two
initial keys. PKI relies on asymmetric key cryptography. The security of
asymmetric cryptography has not been proven according to information theory.
This combination is not used to increase the security of the resulting key, but for
improving the reliability and availability of the applications in case of failure of
the QKD layer: if users can accept data transmission with a security limited by
the conventional key exchange technique, they can avoid stopping all applications.
This method can be seen as a way to improve the availability of the link. Moreover,
dual-key agreements allow the use of keys generated by QKD devices to be certified,
which is required for some applications. Unfortunately, the certification for QKD
devices themselves does not exist yet, but should be available in the near future
thanks to the work on standards for QKD by the Industry Specification Group
initiated by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute [39].
In summary, the SwissQuantum key management layer implements the
following functionalities :
• key redundancy - multiple paths for key generation;
• increase of key generation speed - use of multiple QKD paths for providing
keys to the same application link;
• dual-key agreements - combination of the keys obtained by two independent
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key agreement techniques to generate a resulting key;
• key storage - secure buffers to store the keys.
A detailed description of the implementation is given in section 3.
2.6. Application layer
The application layer is the layer where the keys produced by the quantum layer
and handled by the key management layer are employed by the final user. It
consists of the connection of conventional network devices like switches, routers
or encryptors. This application layer is independent from the quantum and the
key management layers, except for the key requests. All applications requiring
secret keys can make a request to the key server located in the same node. The
reliability and availability of this layer is very important, this is the reason why
the dual-key agreement, as described in the previous section, was implemented in
the key management layer. Dual-key agreement allows one to run the application
layer continuously, even if the quantum layer can not generate any key for some
short period of time. Within the SwissQuantum network, we implemented several
QKD-enhanced encryption applications at both layers 2 and 3:
• 10 Gbps Ethernet encryptors (Layer 2);
• 2 Gbps Fibre Channel device encryptors (Layer 2);
• IPsec encryptors (Layer 3).
Layers 2 and 3 refer to the standard network layers as defined by the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI). Layer 2 is the data link layer, the layer carrying
the Ethernet frames, for instance. Layer 3 is the network layer which carries the
IP packets. The main advantages of performing the encryption in Layer 2 are that
firstly, the encryption does not reduce the bandwidth, and secondly, the latency
introduced by the encryptors is very small. Doing the encryption on Layer 3
strongly reduces the bandwidth of the link because of the need of encapsulation
(addition of extra header and footer to the frame). Furthermore, in general, a
large latency is introduced by Layer 3 encryption due to its implementation which
is done with a microprocessor. However, Layer 3 encryption is more suitable when
the traffic goes through network components that work on Layer 3. Moreover,
Layer 3 encryption (software implementation) is less expensive than Layer 2
encryption (hardware implementation). Hence, each layer has advantages and
disadvantages. The SwissQuantum network demonstrates the versatility of QKD
by the integration of both Layer 2 and Layer 3 devices.
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2.6.1. 10 Gbps Ethernet encryptors (Layer 2) Commercial high-speed Layer 2
encryptors (IDQ, Centauris [40]) that are compatible with QKD performed 10
Gbps Ethernet encryption. They implement the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES, [41]) using a key size of 256 bits and support multiple protocols, among
them Ethernet up to 10 Gbps. These encryptors work with the dual key agreement
between an internal key exchanged via PKI and an external key. The dual key
agreement is done in such a way that the encryptor using it is FIPS 140-2 level3
certified [42]. The exchange of session keys via PKI between two encryptors is
achieved by means of X.509 certificates. Certificates are a form of electronic
credential (like a passport) endorsed by a trusted third party certifying authority
(CA). Each certificate contains an identifying name, unique serial number, expiry
date and public key and prior to installation is signed by the CA.
2.6.2. 2 Gbps Fibre Channel encryptors (Layer 2) The QKD-enhanced
encryption and authentication device [43, 44] performs high-speed 2 Gbps
encryption and authentication of the data at Layer 2. The encrypted and
authenticated data are sent using the Fibre Channel transport mode. These
encryptors support the dual-key agreement, which has been implemented in a
similar way than for the commercial 10 Gbps Ethernet encryptors.
2.6.3. IPsec encryptors (Layer 3) The QKD-enhanced IPsec encryptor integrates
the cryptographic symmetric key generated using the QKD protocol with the
IPsec suite of protocols, in order to provide a point-to-point, quantum-secure
communication link operating at Layer 3.
3. Details on the implementation of the key management layer
3.1. Requirements on the network
The CERN - Unige link was privileged in the SwissQuantum network. Thus,
the architecture and implementation of the SwissQuantum network was developed
such as to reduce as much as possible the risk of losing the availability of this link.
To ensure this, firstly, we used commercial devices to perform the encryption on
this link, secondly, we implemented the key management layer in such a way that
the CERN - Unige link was favoured in relation to the two other links.
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3.2. Implementation of the key management layer
A scheme of the implementation of the key management layer is depicted in
figure 5. The three nodes are implemented in different manners. The three
quantum key exchange links are represented by dashed black lines. Two of the
three connection links carried encrypted data: CERN - Unige and Unige - hepia
(thin dark line in figure 5). The commercial 10 Gbps Ethernet encryptors were
installed between CERN and Unige. The 2 Gbps Fibre Channel encryptors and
IPsec encryptors were tested between Unige and hepia. There is one key server
in each node, which manages the storage and distribution of the secret keys in
several key buffers. Each key buffer is dedicated to a single application.
Figure 5. Key management layer implementation. All the functions in grey
boxes whithin the same node are implemented in the same Key Server, or PC.
As explained above, the CERN - Unige link was privileged and hence we
used the QKD link aggregation scheme to assure redundancy of the key exchange
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between CERN and Unige. This means that the key buffers of the key managers
on this link were filled up with secret keys exchanged through the direct QKD
link, and with secret keys distributed through the intermediate node (hepia) over
the two other QKD links (CERN - hepia and hepia - Unige). The key distribution
through the intermediate node is represented by the two green links in figure 5. A
key redundancy sender in CERN generates a random key K, which is encrypted
with the One-Time-Pad (OTP) protocol. The key used for the OTP encryption
is one of the keys exchanged by the QKD devices between CERN and hepia. The
encrypted key K is sent to the key redundancy node in hepia. This encrypted
key K is decrypted by the key redundancy node and then encrypted with a
key shared between hepia and Unige by QKD. It is sent to the key redundancy
receiver in Unige, and decrypted. At the end of this process, the key K has been
exchanged between CERN and Unige through the intermediate node hepia. The
keys exchanged through the intermediate node are concatenated with the keys
exchanged through the direct link. This concatenation of the keys is represented
by the sign ’
�
’ in figure 5.
Before storing the secret keys in a buffer, an internal dual-key agreement is
performed. The implementation of this PKI is similar to the one in the commercial
10 Gbps encryptors, hence it follows the recommendations of the X.509 standard
and is based on RSA cryptographic scheme. As previously stated, the PKI allows
one to maximize the availability of keys for the secure applications. Some keys are
exchanged between the pairs of key managers using PKI (purple links in figure 5).
These keys are combined with keys provided by the QKD devices using an XOR
operation. This operation is represented by a ’+’ sign in figure 5. The resulting
key can be seen as the cyphertext of the PKI key encrypted using OTP with
the QKD key. OTP is proven information-theoretically secure if it is used with
perfectly random secret keys and each key is used only once. The keys exchanged
through QKD have been proven information-theoretically secure. This means that
the mutual information between the PKI key and the resulting key is equal to zero.
Hence, knowing the PKI key does not give any information on the resulting key.
Moreover, since the QKD key is random and independent on the PKI key, the
resulting key is random too. So, even if the PKI key is entirely known to the
adversary, the resulting key is secure. The resulting keys are stored in the key
buffers and are sent by the key managers to the applications each time a new key
is needed.
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4. Long term performance of the quantum layer
In telecommunication networks, one of the most important figures of merit is
the bit rate. By analogy, the secret key rate is considered as the key parameter
for QKD devices. The secret key rate is derived from the raw key rate and the
quantum bit error rate (QBER). Thus, the probability of detection - giving the
raw detection rate by multiplying it by the number of gates per second - and the
QBER measurement are reported, as well as the secret key rate, in this section.
4.1. Probability of detection
Figure 6 presents the probability of detection for the single-photon detector 1 of
the different systems. The probability of detection is the probability of having a
detector click - due to a photon or a dark count - per gate of activation of the
detector. The probability of detection is calculated over the time period needed
to fill the buffer with raw detection data.
Figure 6. Probability of detection as a function of time for detector 1 of SQ1
(top), SQ2 (middle) and SQ3 (bottom) links. Detector 2 has similar behaviour.
(The grey areas are guides to find the perturbations described in the text.)
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Although the probability of detection was rather stable over the 21 months,
there were several perturbations or variations which can be seen in figure 6. We
assign those variations to two different classes. The first class corresponds to a long-
term change of the mean detection probability. The second class of perturbations
corresponds to short-time changes.
The long-term variations of mean detection probability value levels can be
explained as follows:
• after about 15 days, the probabilities of detection of the different systems was
optimized to maximize the secret key rate after initial test phase (SQ1 to
SQ3);
• after a power cut at CERN around day 260, we took the opportunity to change
some settings in the single-photon detectors of the three systems. Indeed, we
noticed during the first 260 days of working that the temperature in the IT
rooms at hepia and Unige was not always below 30◦C. ID Quantique systems
are specified to work at a maximal room temperature of 30◦C. This limit
is due to the cooling capability of the APDs in the single-photon detection
modules. To reduce the risk of having the system stopped due to a too
high room temperature, we have changed the cooling temperature from -50◦C
to -40◦C. After changing the temperature, we tuned the detector efficiency
at values close to the previous ones but slightly different. This explains the
differences in the mean detection probability values measured before and after
this intervention especially for SQ1 and SQ2.
The short-term interruptions/reductions of detection probability are mainly
due to external problems and not directly to the quantum layer. The most
important problems encountered are listed below:
• 20th of August 2009 to 2nd of September: bug in the software handling
the communication between the QKD servers and the key servers. The bug
appears only on the SQ3 link. It was fixed for all systems.
• 2nd of December 2009: power cut at CERN, SQ1 and SQ2 links down for
about 8 hours.
• 29th of June 2010: air conditioning problem at hepia: it was not possible to
maintain the temperature of the single-photon detectors in Bob (SQ2 link) at
-40oC with an external temperature of 45oC. SQ2 link down for few hours.
There was no problem with Alice (SQ3 link) except a small reduction of the
bit rate due to a small decrease of the visibility.
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• 27th of July 2010: general maintenance problem at hepia leaving all systems in
the server room without power for the weekend. SQ2 and SQ3 links were down
for the weekend. However, it took a few days to recover the stability because
of the maintenance activities in the server room (not on the SwissQuantum
systems).
• 18th of December 2010: power cut at the CERN during a weekend. SQ1 and
SQ2 links down for the weekend.
4.2. Quantum bit error rate
The QBER was also recorded during the full period of the experiment (see
figure 7). The fluctuations observed are due to statistical fluctuations and
detection probability fluctuations. Nevertheless, the value of the QBER was pretty
low and stable during the 21 months.
Figure 7. QBER as a function of time for SQ1 (top), SQ2 (middle) and SQ3
(bottom) links.
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4.3. Secret key rate
For the final user of the application layer, the most important parameter is the
number of keys that he can use for its applications. In the SwissQuantum network,
the devices employed 256-bit keys. Figure 8 presents the number of 256-bit keys
generated per day. This rate is quite stable over more than 600 days. Thus, the
QKD systems deployed in the SwissQuantum network proved the robustness of
QKD for long-term deployment in telecommunications networks. As explained
above, some interruptions in the secret bit rate generation have been observed.
They are mainly due to external reasons, and the systems always recovered when
the environment conditions went back to normal.
Figure 8. Number of 256-bit keys per day. The number of 256-bit keys created
per day is larger for the SQ3 link, because the optical attenuation of this link
is lower than for the SQ1 and SQ2 links at similar detector efficiencies. The
number of keys per day for the SQ1 and SQ2 links are similar.
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4.4. Variation of the optical fibre length
For the stability of the QKD layer over the 21 month period, the adaptation to
the variations of the optical path is crucial. The length of the optical path is
important for most QKD implementation schemes and especially for the plug &
play one, because it defines when the single-photon detectors have to be activated
to detect the photons coming from Alice [22]. The optical path changes due to
variations of the physical length and/or the refraction index of the optical fibre.
These changes are essentially consequences of temperature variations. Figure 9
presents the variation of the optical path length (go&return) and the temperature
in Geneva. The absolute optical length variation is calculated relative to the mean
optical length over the 21 months.
As can be seen in figure 9, the variations of the optical length and the
temperature are very similar. The absolute deviations are larger for the SQ1
and SQ2 links than for the SQ3 link, since the fibres of SQ1 and SQ2 links are
longer than the one of the SQ3 link and the variations of the optical length are
proportional to the fibre length. In sub-figure (a), the seasonal variations are
presented. The amplitude of the variations is 6 meters corresponding to 30 ns in
optical fibre. As the width of detection gates is shorter than 2 ns and the width
of the laser pulse is shorter than 1 ns, the length of the optical path has to be
monitored to adjust the activation time of the detectors [22]. Sub-figure (b) gives
the variations over three typical days. There is a shift of few hours between the
optical length variations and the temperature. This is due to the inertia of the
system. The temperature is measured in air, but most of the fibres are under
ground. The important fact to underline is that the QKD devices are sufficiently
flexible to automatically follow the variations of the optical path length.
5. Performance of the application layer
The test of the performance of application layer was not the primary goal of the
SwissQuantum network, however, some tests were done. On the link CERN-Unige,
the commercial encryptors (ID Quantique, Centauris) worked perfectly for the full
duration of the SwissQuantum network with transmission of real data on the link.
The 2 Gbps Fibre Channel encryptors (Layer 2) and the IPsec encryptors (Layer 3)
were tested with Fibre Channel and Ethernet Test Modules (Exfo, FTB-8525/8535
Packet Blazer) racked in Universal Test System (Exfo, FTB-400). The systems
were tested over months and the performances where in the specifications of the
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(a) (b)
Figure 9. Variations of the optical fibre length and temperature in Geneva for
go&return path. (a) 21-months measurement. (b) 3 days zoom
2 Gbps Fibre Channel and the IPsec protocols. The 256-bit key were changed
each minute for the different encryptors. The change of key in the commercial
encryptors was done without loss of bandwidth. The 2 Gbps Fibre Channel
required 100 ns to change the key. For the IPsec encryptors, no measurement
was done on the latency introduced by the key change because it has a negligible
effect compare to the intrinsic throughput reduction due to encapsulation. For
example, we measured an output throughput of IPsec varying from 10 to 95% of
the input throughput depending on the frame size.
6. Conclusion
The SwissQuantum network demonstrates that QKD has the maturity to be
deployed in telecommunications networks. It has proven its reliability and
robustness in a real life environment outside of the laboratory. Furthermore,
it shows that QKD technology can be integrated in quite complex network
infrastructures. Those networks need a layer which makes the interface between
the QKD layer (layer where the secret keys are exchanged) and the application
layer (layer where the keys are used by the secure applications). Within the
SwissQuantum project both the QKD layer and the interface layer, called key
management layer, have run for more than one and a half year. The key
management layer implemented in the SwissQuantum network takes over the
concept of link aggregation. It allows the increase of the bandwidth and availability
of secret keys between two locations connected through several links.
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